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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELAINE D. BRODERICK,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 960775-CA
Oral Argument
Priority 15

vs.
BOYD E. BRODERICK,
Defendant-Appellant.
ALMA L. BRODERICK and
SEPHRONIA L. BRODERICK,
Intervenors-Appellants,
JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from a final decree in a domestic relations
matter.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.
property

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in making a
division which

equity, and

adjusted

equally divided

for the premarital

the marital property?

debt

and

The trial

court's adjustment of the parties' property interests is reviewed
for abuse of discretion.

Watson v. Watson, 837 P. 2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct.

App. 1992) (citation omitted).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding wife

a nominal amount of permanent alimony, where the evidence showed
she was unable to work or to support herself, and the husband was
awarded the parties' income producing assets?

The trial court's

award of alimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Brienholt v.

Brienholt. 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
3.
farm

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the

property

and

water

shares

to

Husband,

where

there

competent evidence presented at trial to support the award.

was
Wife

does not challenge Interveners' statement that the standard of
review is abuse of discretion.
4.

Was the finding that Intervenors were bound by a rental

agreement clearly erroneous, where evidence of the agreement and
debt was admitted without objection?

Contrary to Intervenors'

assertion, this issue is not reviewed for correctness.

"The issue

of whether a contract exists may present both questions of law and
fact, depending on the nature of the claims raised."

Cal Wadsworth

Const, v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Ct. App. 1993),
affirmed, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995).

The issue here was whether

the parties intended the contract to be binding.

Such matters are

factual, and the trial court's finding should be affirmed unless
clearly erroneous.

Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Heriford, 772

P.2d 466, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

The correctness of the trial

court's implied finding that the contract was not abandoned should
also be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.

Timpanogos Highlands,

Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 484-85 (Utah 1975).

This case also

presents an issue as to whether the parties abandoned the contract.
This issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994).
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State v. Pena, 869

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Ann. § 30-3-5(7-9) (Supp. 1997) states:
(a)

(b)
(c)

(d)

(e)

The court shall consider at least
the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and
needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity
or
ability
to
produce
income;
(iii)the ability of the payor spouse
to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
The court may consider the fault of
the parties in determining alimony.
As a general rule, the court should
look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation,
in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (a) . However, the
court shall consider all relevant
facts and equitable principles and
may, in its discretion, base alimony
on the standard of living that
existed at the time of trial. In
marriages of short duration, when no
children have been conceived or born
during the marriage, the court may
consider the standard of living that
existed at the time of the marriage.
The court may, under appropriate
circumstances, attempt to equalize
the parties' respective standards of
living.
When a marriage of long duration
dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of
the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall
be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the
amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly
enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the
court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony.
3

(f)

In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived
or born during the marriage, the
court may consider restoring each
party to the condition which existed
at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes
and
new
orders
regarding alimony based on a
substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable
at the time of the divorce,
(ii) The
court may
not
modify
alimony or issue a new order
for alimony to address needs of
the recipient that did not
exist at the time the decree
was entered, unless the court
finds extenuating circumstances
that justify that action,
(iii)
In determining alimony,
the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor
may not be considered,
except as provided
in
this subsection.
(A) The court may consider
the subsequent spouse's
financial
ability
to
share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider
the income of a subsequent spouse if the court
finds that the payor's
improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a
duration longer than the number of
years that the marriage existed
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating
circumstances
that
justify the payment of alimony for a
longer period of time.
Unless a decree of divorce specifically
provides otherwise, any order of the
court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse automatically terminates

4

upon the remarriage of that former
spouse• However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio,
payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to
the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse terminates
upon establishment by the party paying
alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.

division in a divorce case.

This is an appeal from a property
The interveners joined to protect

their claims to land and water stock used by the couple.
B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below.

Elaine

Broderick ("Wife") filed her complaint for divorce on September 14,
1994.

(R. 3-1.J1

October 5, 1994.

Boyd E. Broderick
(R. 8-7.)

("Husband") answered on

On February 28, 1995, Alma L.

Broderick and Sephronia L. Broderick

("Intervenors"), who are

Husband's parents, sought to intervene to protect their claimed
interest in certain assets used by Husband and Wife.
Wife

(R. 39) and Husband

(R. 43) each

stipulated

intervention, and the motion was granted May 15, 1995.
The Intervenors filed a complaint in intervention.
52.)

(R. 24.)
to the
(R. 55.)
(R. 53-

Husband answered and essentially admitted the Intervenors'
1

The documents are assembled in the record in reverse
chronological order, and as a result the numbering added by the
clerk in preparation for appeal is in reverse order on each
document.
S

allegations.

(R. 51-50.)

interveners' allegations.

Wife answered and denied most of the
(R. 47-45, 62-60.)

The matter was tried to the court on October 13, 1995.
75-73.)

(R.

Husband did not contest the granting of the divorce, and

the parties stipulated to the division of most items of personal
property.

(R. 227-28, 241-43, 282, 301-02, 347.)

The parties

presented evidence concerning th€» farm and water stock, certain
residences owned by the parties, and debts related to the farm.
On January 17, 1996, the court issued its memorandum decision
awarding the farm to Husband, the Sutherland homes to Wife, denying
any credit for a premarital tax debt of Husband's which was paid by
Wife, denying any alimony, and denying Wife any recovery on a
claimed rental agreement against Intervenors.

(R. 84-76.)

The

formal Decree of Divorce (R. 96-94) and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 93-85) were entered February 28, 1996.
On February 29, 1996, Wife served a Motion to Amend Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.

(R. 101-97.)

On October 13, 1996, the trial court granted the motion and ordered
the decree amended to provide that the parties should retain their
separate property and debts brought into the marriage, consisting
of

$51,000.00

of equity Wife brought

into the marriage and

$20,256.72 of debt which Husband contributed.

The court also

awarded Wife judgment against Intervenors for rental payments,
awarded Wife alimony of $175.00 per month, and made other minor
adjustments.

(R. 147-44.)

An Amended Decree of Divorce (R. 170-

6

165) and Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 164152) were entered on November 1, 1996.
On

November

27,

1996,

both

Husband

(R.

Intervenors (R. 181-180) filed notices of appeal.

178-177)

and

On January 28,

1997, Husband also filed a Motion for Relief Under Rule 60(b)(1)
and Rule 62(b) U.R.C.P.

(Document appears in the record but has

not been given index numbers.)
hearing on June 17, 1997.

The motion was denied following a

(Minute entry appears in the record but

has not been assigned an index number.)
C.

Statement

October 24, 1987.

Of

Facts.

Husband

and Wife were

married

(R. 201.) At the time of the marriage, Wife was

working and making $13.00 per hour (R. 296), had money in the bank
(R. 295, 335) and had $51,000.00 equity in her home.
6.)

(R. 163, f

Husband was working and making approximately $14.00 per hour

(R. 296), but owed approximately $2 0,000.00 to the Internal Revenue
Service.

(R. 270.)

After the marriage, the parties
Southgate, California.

(R. 203.)

lived

in Wife's home

in

They refinanced the home in

December, 1987, to obtain money to pay Husband's IRS debt.

(R.

204.)
The
marriage.

parties
The

experienced

initial

marriage.

parties

separations

separation was

separation was in June, 1994.
The

several

purchased

in

1990.

during
Their

the
final

(R. 204.)
several

properties

during

their

In September, 1988, they purchased a home in Delta,

^

Utah,

from Interveners•

(R. 216, Exhibit

4.)

purchased a 70-acre farm in Millard County.

In March, 1990,

they

(R. 219, Exhibit 5.)

In connection with the purchase of the farm, they also purchased 62
shares of Melville water stock and 3 0 shares of Deseret water
stock.

(R. 223, Exhibit 7.)

Finally, in June, 1993, they

purchased a small home in Sutherland, Utah.

(R. 221, Exhibit 6.)

An additional two shares of Deseret water stock were purchased as
part of the Sutherland home.

(R. 157, \ 27.)

Wife's health started to fail in 1990. She continued to work
for a time, but in November, 1992, stopped working and went on
disability.

(R. 215.) At the time of trial, Wife was 51 years old

and was under a doctor's care for high blood pressure, pituitary
gland tumor, depression, asthma and sleep apnea.

She previously

had a stroke. She was taking seven different types of medications.
(R. 202.)

Wife lived with her parents and received food and

clothing worth more than $150.00 to $200.00 per month from them.
(R. 203, 213, 256.)

Because of her poor health, Wife tired very

easily and was easily depressed and was mentally not responsible
for her actions.

(R. 255.)

Wife's mother had therefore been

appointed by Social Security to manage all of Wife's finances. (R.
202, 254-55.)
Husband was in good health at the time of the divorce.
203.)

(R.

He asserted that he had attempted to find work but had been

unsuccessful.

(R. 280.)

At the time of the divorce, he worked

once a week at a livestock auction, making $25.00 each time.
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(R.

267.)

He also worked on the farm.

His testimony concerning the

profitability of the farm was confusing, but he claimed to be
making $9,000.00 per year.

(R. 262-63, 288.)

He also receives

about $250.00 per month from a rental home which he inherited.
248, 276.)

(R.

The trial court found that he was able-bodied and

imputed income of $736.67 per month to him.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wife's contribution to the marriage included $51,000 of equity
in her home. Husband's contribution was over $20,000 of debt. It
was proper for the trial court to adjust for these premarital
contributions. The property division is approximately equal after
the premarital contributions are considered, and does not show an
abuse of discretion.
Permanent alimony was justified.
unable to obtain employment.

Wife was seriously ill and

Husband was able bodied and was

awarded income producing assets.

The alimony award was supported

by the necessary findings and within the court's discretion.
Intervenors have not shown that the award of the farm and
water stock to Husband was clearly erroneous. There is evidence to
support the finding that the farm was owned by the parties.

Even

if Intervenors' names were on the farm title, the evidence showed
that was only to assist the parties in obtaining a loan and was not
intended to pass title.

9

The judgment to Wife on the rental agreement was supported by
competent evidence.

The judgment of the trial court should be

affirmed in all respects.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE PROPERTY DIVISION ADJUSTED FOR THE
PARTIES7 PREMARITAL POSITIONS AND DID
NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The trial court awarded Wife the Sutherland home, which was
not subject to any liens,2 and awarded to Husband the farm and the
associated water stock, which was income producing property.
262-63, 281, 285.)
that

it

results

(R.

Husband now challenges that division, claiming
in

a

total

value

to

Wife

contrasted to a negative $509.00 to Husband.

of

$70,587.00

as

(Husband/s brief, pp.

This argument is misleading because it ignores the parties 7

7-8.)

premarital positions.
"As a general rule, equity requires that each party retain the
separate property he or she brought into the marriage." Haumont v.
Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),

The trial court

found, and Husband has not challenged that finding, that Wife came
into the marriage with $51,000.00 of equity in the Southgate home,
plus

a

substantial

amount

of

money

2

in

the

bank.

Husband's

The parties did borrow money to purchase the home, but the
loan was secured by water stock used on the farm and not by the
home. (R. 210.)
10

premarital position, in contrast, was a $20,256.72 debt to the IRS.
The trial court expressly acknowledged the rule that the parties
should retain their separate property and debts brought into the
marriage and made a property settlement which adjusted for that.
(R. 146.)

When the summary from page 8 of Husband's brief is

adjusted for the premarital positions, it reveals that the trial
court equally divided the parties' marital property.

Subtracting

Wife's premarital equity from the net property award described on
page

8

of

Husband's

$19,587.00.
that

debt

brief

yields

a

net

property

award

of

Adjusting for Husband's premarital debt, by adding
to

his

award,

yields

a

net

property

division

of

$19,747.72 to Husband, which is more than that awarded to Wife.
The property division must also be considered in light of the
fact that Husband was healthy and able to work, and was awarded the
parties' only

income producing

asset.

Wife was disabled

and

dependent upon disability income and charity from her parents. The
division of the parties' property was well within the trial court's
discretion.
Husband also claims the property division is not supported by
the court's findings.

There is no question that paragraphs 22 and

23 of the findings contain a misstatement of fact, and that the
misstatement does not support the court's conclusion.

A review of

the procedural history of the case, however, demonstrates that the
error is clerical only.

The court's initial decision following

trial did not adjust for the parties' premarital position.

11

The

court equally divided the parties'' existing assets. Paragraphs 22
and 2 3 of the findings were prepared at that time,. Wife then moved
to amend the findings and the decree to adjust for the premarital
positions. The trial court granted the motion and added additional
findings, including paragraphs 6 and 8 of the findings. Paragraphs
22 and 2 3 were not modified in the final document, which was
prepared by Wife's counsel. Although the error exists, it is clear
from the findings what the trial court intended. When the obvious
clerical error is removed from consideration, the findings fully
support the trial court's conclusions.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE STATUTORY
FACTORS IN AWARDING ALIMONY.
The trial court ordered Husband, who was able-bodied and who
was awarded the parties' only income producing asset, to pay
alimony

of $175.00 per month to Wife, who was disabled and

dependent upon public assistance.

The alimony was to continue

until Wife remarried, cohabited, or became otherwise not legally
entitled to the alimony.

(R. 168.)

Husband claims that this

provision violates Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1997),
which states:
Alimony may not be ordered for a duration
longer than the numb€>r of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of
time.
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The trial court complied with this statute.

Paragraph 7 of

the findings reflects the court's consideration of the statutory
factors.

The court found that Wife was disabled.

The evidence

showed that she was receiving state disability and also being
assisted by her parents in an amount in excess of $150.00 to
$200.00 per month.

She was physically, emotionally, and mentally

unable to handle her finances or support herself.
contrast, was

able-bodied, had

received

Husband, in

the parties7

income

producing asset, and had historically earned more than Wife.

The

parties had been married for nine years at the time the decree was
entered.
The

statute

does not

specify

exactly

what

"extenuating

circumstances" will qualify for extension of alimony longer than
the length of the marriage, and case law has not yet defined those
factors.

One of those factors certainly should include, however,

the circumstance present here.

Wife was ill, and there was no

indication other than that the illness was permanent. This was not
a situation where the wife would be able to return to work after
receiving alimony to assist her in education and job training.
Wife was permanently disabled.

Wife was 51 years old at the time

of trial (R. 2 02) and therefore 52 years old at the time the decree
was entered.

Continuing the alimony for only the same number of

years as the marriage would have resulted in alimony terminating
when Wife was approximately 61 years old.

The possibility of a

disabled person obtaining employment at the age of 61 years is

13

slim.

There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court ordering

that alimony continue.
POINT III
THE AWARD OF ALL OF THE FARM AND WATER STOCK
TO HUSBAND WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Intervenors challenged the trial court's award of all of the
70-acre farm and 3 0 shares of Deseret water stock to Husband.
Intervenors

asked

the

court

to

correct

the

claimed

error

by

awarding the farm and the 30 shares of Deseret water stock equally
to Husband and to Intervenors.

Although this issue technically

concerns only Husband, Wife addresses it because it may affect the
overall equity of the property settlement.
Husband challenges the trial court's finding in paragraph 11
of the Findings of Fact, that Husband and Wife purchased the farm.
In order to challenge the finding, Intervenors were required to
show

that

erroneous.

the

trial

court's

factual

findings

were

clearly

Intervenors were required to marshal1 all the evidence

supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the finding lacked
support.

American Rural Cellular. Inc. v. Systems Communication

Corp., 318 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Ct. App. May 30, 1997).
Marshalling the evidence would have revealed the following:
Wife testified that she and Husband purchased the farm.
220.)

(R. 219-

No other evidence was presented at trial concerning the

status of the title to the farm.

There was testimony concerning

the names on the water stock (R. 315), but no similar testimony

14

concerning the names on the farm title.

The most that parents

testified was that they had a "substantial financial investment" in
the farm (R. 316) , and that they claimed "an interest" in the farm.
(R. 318.)

There was testimony that the water stock was put in the

four names in connection with obtaining a loan.

(R. 322, 343.)

There was no corresponding evidence concerning the title on the
farm.

Intervenors testified concerning payments they made on the

farm, but Wife disagreed with that testimony.

(R. 341-342.)

The

evidence on which Intervenors now rely, a copy of the plat map, was
simply an exhibit attached to an appraisal on the farm (Exhibit
15) , and was not called to the court's attention nor offered as
evidence of the title on the farm.
More

importantly, even if Intervenors' names were on the

title, that did not compel awarding the farm to them.

There was

evidence that their names were put on the water stock solely in
connection with obtaining a loan, and if their names were on the
land title also, it was presumably for only the same purpose.

It

is well established that a divorce court may distribute property
among the parties regardless of the status of the title.
v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980).

Jackson

Outside a divorce,

courts will implement the intent of the parties notwithstanding a
deed which appears absolute on its face.

Bown v. Loveland, 678

P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984).
If Intervenors were on the deed in this case, the evidence
supports the conclusion that their names were there only for the

15

purpose of obtaining a loan. The trial court did specifically find
that the Interveners' contributions to the farm and water stock
were minimal compared with the value, and found that giving the
Intervenors an interest in just the water stock still resulted in
a significant windfall to them.

(R. 159, f 20.)

Intervenors have

not challenged this finding, and it is amply supported by the
evidence.

The decision of the trial court awarding the farm to

Husband should be affirmed.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT ON
THE RENTAL AGREEMENT.
Wife testified that Alma Broderick, one of the Intervenors,
signed a rental agreement in favor of Husband regarding the Delta
home.

(R. 211, 333-335.)

It was undisputed that Intervenors had

not paid the rent required by the agreement.

Because the Delta

home was owned by Husband and Wife jointly, the rent owed on that
home was part of the marital property and subject to division by
the court.

See Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986) (court

has power to divide property regardless of how titled).
Intervenors now claim the rental agreement was abandoned.
Abandonment must be shown by clear and unequivocal evidence, and
requires proof of an intentional relinquishment of one's rights in
the contract.

Timpanocros Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481,

484 (Utah 1975).

Accord Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings

& Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993) (proof of waiver must
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be distinct).

This court should also consider that the parties to

the contract are presumed to be have intended what the contract
said.

Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 541-42

(192 3)

(The

law

"judges

of

his

intentions

by

his

outward

expressions and excludes all questions in regard to his unexpressed
intention.

If his words or acts, judged by a reasonable standard,

manifest an intention to agree to the matter in question, that
agreement is established, and it is immaterial what may be the real
but unexpressed state of his mind upon the subject.")
omitted).

(citation

This court should presume that the parties did not

intentionally enter into an agreement which was a nullity.

The

trial court found the contract was validly entered, and that the
debt remained unpaid.

The evidence supports these findings, and

the judgment should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court carefully considered the evidence ana reacn a
property

division

which

adjusts

for

positions and is fair and equitable.

the

parties 7

premarital

Appellants have not shown

that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous, or that the
trial court abused its discretion.
DATED this

2 &

This Court should affirm.

day of August, 1997.

DON R. PETERSEN and
A
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
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